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11 Introduction
Contract theory is one of the most active ﬁelds of research in contemporary
microeconomics. One of the reasons why it has been particularly popular in
recent years may be the fact that many economists think that the incomplete
contracts approach as pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and
Moore (1990) can help to answer important questions regarding the bound-
aries of the ﬁrm, which have been raised by Coase (1937) and more recently by
Williamson (1985). In the meantime, the incomplete contract paradigm has
been fruitfully applied to many relevant economic topics which are no longer
restricted to the theory of the ﬁrm.1 However, several economic theorists
still feel uncomfortable about important issues surrounding the incomplete
contracts approach. Why should one only compare the consequences of writ-
i n go n eo ft w o‘ s i m p l e ’c o n t r a c t s ,C1 or C2, w h i c hb o t hr e s u l ti ni n e ﬃcient
outcomes, if there could be a more sophisticated contract, C3,w h i c hm i g h t
even implement the ﬁrst best?2 Such concerns have lead some researchers to a
renewed interest in the more traditional theory of complete contracts, which
is closely related to the theory of implementation or mechanism design.3
1Browsing through recent issues of economic journals, one quickly ﬁnds papers which
apply incomplete contracting in ﬁelds such as political economy, ﬁscal federalism, in-
dustrial organization, public procurement, regulation, privatization, transition economies,
international trade or law and economics.
2For example, C1 could give the right to make a future decision to party 1, while C2
allocates the right to party 2. Hence, a comparison of C1 and C2 can reveal when it is
better to give party 1 or party 2 the authority to make the decision. Yet, there may be
a superior contract C3 that prescribes a decision depending on future announcements of
the parties, so that it is unclear why any party should have authority at all.
3See the surveys of Moore (1992a) for implementation in the complete information
framework and Palfrey and Srivastava (1993) for Bayesian implementation. Implementa-
2This article complements existing surveys on contract theory in two ways.4
First, the surveys that I am aware of are of a quite technical nature and there-
fore diﬃcult to access for readers who are not already specialists in the ﬁeld.
In contrast, while trying to be as rigorous as necessary, this paper presents
all ideas verbally without any mathematical pyrotechnics. Second, instead
of attempting to be exhaustive and to provide ﬁnal answers, this paper is
focused on some speciﬁc topics which received particular attention by re-
searchers in recent years and puts emphasis on open questions that should
be addressed in future research.
2 What are incomplete contracts?
Given the fact that the theory of incomplete contracts has received consider-
able attention in recent years, it is interesting to note that there is no clear
deﬁnition of what really constitutes an incomplete contract.5 One popular
view is that incomplete contract theorists restrict the class of contracts they
consider in an ad hoc way. It is then diﬃcult to judge whether a given con-
tract is incomplete or not. Let a certain allocation problem be given and
assume that without restricting the class of admissible contracts one could
show that some contract C1 is optimal. If a model builder took only the
(maybe ‘simple’) contracts C1 and C2 into consideration and conjectured that
C1 i so p t i m a l ,o n ec o u l dn o tb es u r et h a tt h e r ee x i s t sn os u p e r i o r( m a y b e
tion theory considers the case of many agents and is focused on uniqueness of equilibrium
outcomes, while contract theory has its roots in the principal-agent framework and often
assumes that parties can select an equilibrium when writing a contract.
4See Hart and Holmström (1987), Salanié (1997), and Schweizer (1999). See Hart
(1995) and Tirole (1999) for discussions of incomplete contracts.
5See for instance Hermalin and Katz (1993) and Tirole (1999).
3‘complex’) contract C3.6 The modeler hence would have chosen an incom-
plete contracts approach. Nevertheless, had he taken a complete contracts
approach (i.e., had he not restricted his search to C1 and C2), he would have
f o u n dt h es a m ec o n t r a c tC1. It therefore does not make much sense to call
the contract C1 either complete or incomplete. What may really be incom-
plete is the model builder’s justiﬁcation to consider only {C1,C 2}. Hence, it
is diﬃcult to understand what could be the meaning of a theoretical founda-
tion for the incomplete contracts approach. If one could prove that no other
contract can dominate {C1,C 2}, then one would in fact be back in the world
of complete contracts, since such a proof would require the consideration of
all contracts which are feasible given the allocation problem.
Some authors use the label ‘incomplete contracts’ only when referring to
the class of models initiated by Grossman and Hart (1986). These models,
which will be discussed in Section 4, are mainly concerned with the optimal
allocation of asset ownership and are also known under the label ‘property
rights approach’. An important ingredient of these models is the so called
hold-up problem. The following section introduces the hold-up problem and
explains how traditional contract theory deals with this problem.
3 The hold-up problem
3.1 Symmetric information
Consider the following allocation problem A1. There are two risk-neutral
parties. One of the parties, the (potential) seller, possesses one unit of an
6Of course, if C1 already achieves the ﬁrst best, then there is no need to consider other
contracts.
4indivisible good. The other party, the (potential) buyer, is interested in this
good. It is eﬃcient to exchange the good whenever the buyer’s valuation
exceeds the seller’s costs. Assume that there are no wealth constraints and
that there is no private information. Then, according to the Coase Theorem,7
voluntary bargaining among the parties will result in trade whenever it is
eﬃcient.
Now consider the more complicated allocation problem A2. Assume that
the two parties meet at some initial date 0. At date 1, the seller can exert
eﬀort (or make an investment).8 At date 2, the buyer’s valuation and the
seller’s cost of trade are realized and the good can be exchanged. Valuation
and cost can depend on the seller’s investment and on the realization of an
ex ante uncertain state of the world. It is useful to distinguish two special
cases. Following Che and Hausch (1999), the seller’s eﬀort is called “self
investment” if it aims at decreasing the seller’s date-2-costs, while it is called
“cooperative investment” if it aims at increasing the buyer’s valuation.9 The
ex post eﬃcient trade decision is to exchange the good whenever the seller’s
date-2-costs are smaller than the buyer’s valuation, while the ex ante eﬃcient
7For a discussion of the Coase Theorem, see Schweizer (1988) and the literature cited
there.
8For simplicity, the discussion will be focused on the case of one-sided investment. If
the buyer also has an investment opportunity, it is more diﬃcult to develop an intuition
(since there is an additional team-problem involved). I will make some remarks on which
results carry over to this more general case.
9Cooperative investment is particularly natural if the seller produces the good at date
1( e ﬀort increases the quality of the good). In this case it may well happen that the seller
has no additional costs of trade at date 2 (so that trade is always ex post eﬃcient). In the
case of self investment it is natural to assume that the seller produces the good at date 2,
and the production costs can be reduced by date-1-investments.
5eﬀort level maximizes the total expected surplus including the seller’s eﬀort
costs, given the ex post eﬃcient trade decision. The ﬁrst best is achieved if
the ex ante eﬃcient eﬀort decision and the ex post eﬃcient trade decision
are made.
Assume ﬁrst that the valuations are common knowledge at date 2. If
the parties have not written a contract at date 0, they still exchange the
good whenever the buyer’s valuation is larger than the seller’s cost, i.e., ex
post eﬃciency is always achieved according to the Coase Theorem. However,
does the seller exert the ex ante eﬃcient amount of eﬀort? She will certainly
do so if she has all the bargaining power at date 2. In this case she can
make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the buyer which makes him just indiﬀerent
between accepting and rejecting, so that the seller receives the total return
to her investment. However, if the buyer has all the bargaining power at
date 2, he will leave the seller no rent, so that she has no incentive to invest.
In this case a ‘hold-up problem’ occurs, i.e., the fact that the seller does not
receive the fruits of her investment lead her to underinvest. Yet, there is no
accepted theory that allows to predict which bargaining game the parties will
play. For example, nature might give each party the opportunity to make
a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer with probability 1/2, which gives each party half
of the date-2-surplus in expectation.10 This would correspond to the Nash
bargaining solution with ‘no trade’ as threatpoint, and there would again be
a hold-up problem since the seller does not receive the full marginal returns
on her investment.
Of course, the parties can write a contract at date 0. If the seller’s eﬀort
were veriﬁable, it could simply be made part of the contract. Now assume
that eﬀort is only observable by the parties, but not veriﬁable by the court.
10See also Hart (1995, p. 77).
6If the parties’ valuations were veriﬁable, one could still achieve the ﬁrst best.
The contract could simply specify trade whenever it is ex post eﬃcient and
make the seller residual claimant (i.e., give her the total surplus at date 2).11
Most of the literature considers the case in which the valuations are ob-
servable by the two parties, but unveriﬁable to the court. If the parties can
commit not to renegotiate, this causes no additional problems. The par-
ties can write a contract which speciﬁes the following ‘message game’ to be
played at date 2: The buyer and the seller both simultaneously report the
seller’s costs as well as the buyer’s valuation to the court. If the reports of
the parties match, then the good is exchanged at a price which equals the
(reported) buyer’s valuation, provided that this covers the (reported) seller’s
costs. If the reports do not match, no trade and no payments occur. Given
that one party tells the truth, it is optimal for the other party also to tell the
truth. The seller gets the total surplus and hence has the right incentives to
invest. Of course, truth-telling is only one equilibrium in this ‘shoot-the-liar-
mechanism’. But implementation theory has developed more sophisticated
mechanisms in which the equilibrium outcome is unique under quite gen-
eral circumstances.12 In the present setting, it is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd such a
sophisticated mechanism.13 Even if both parties have investment opportuni-
11Note that the buyer could be compensated by an up-front lump sum payment without
altering the incentives.
12See Moore and Repullo (1988) and Moore (1992a). Since nearly everything is (at least
virtually) implementable in the complete information framework, some authors think that
this branch of literature is by now (at least virtually) dead. However, the diﬃcult issue of
renegotiation might lead to a renewed interest in this ﬁeld (see Maskin and Moore, 1999).
13Consider the following ‘ﬁll-in-the-price-mechanism’: At date 2, the seller can name a
price and the buyer can subsequently decide whether or not to trade at that price. It is
straightforward to see that in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome the seller
7ties, it has been shown by Rogerson (1992) for the case of self investments
and by Che and Hausch (1999) for the case of cooperative investments, that
the ﬁrst best can be achieved in such a way in quite general settings.
Some authors question the relevance of results along these lines for two
diﬀerent but related reasons, linked by the role that can be played by renego-
tiation. First, a major problem of traditional complete contract theory is the
fact that optimal contracts are often more complex than real world contracts.
Contract theorists have exerted considerable eﬀort in order to show that in
certain circumstances ‘simple contracts’ are optimal.14 In an interesting pa-
per, Huberman and Kahn (1988) argue that optimal complex contracts may
sometimes be substituted by simple, unconditional contracts, when they are
renegotiated at a later date.15 Hence, renegotiation may be helpful in order
to explain the prevalence of simple contracts.
S e c o n d ,s o m ea u t h o r sa r g u et h a ti ft h em e s s a g eg a m et h a ti ss p e c i ﬁed in
the initial contract leads to an ex post ineﬃcient outcome (which happens
receives the total gains from trade. Hermalin and Katz (1993) show that even if both
parties have to make self investments, the ﬁrst best can be achieved by such a mechanism
when it is augmented by a base price which has to be paid independent of whether trade
occurs or not.
14For example, Holmström and Milgrom (1987) prove that in a dynamic principal agent
framework linear contracts can be optimal in suﬃciently complex environments. Yet, their
result depends on several technical assumptions. Romano (1994) and Bhattacharyya and
Lafontaine (1995) show that linear contracts can implement the second best in Holm-
ström’s (1982) ‘moral hazard in teams’ problem. However, Kim and Wang (1998) argue
that this result is not robust if agents are (slightly) risk-averse.
15For instance, Hermalin and Katz (1991) show that in the traditional principal agent
model the ﬁrst best can be achieved if the principal observes the agent’s eﬀort, either
with complex contracts specifying message games, or with simpler contracts which are
renegotiated. The authors argue that the latter case is more natural.
8out of equilibrium only), then the parties will renegotiate towards the Pareto
frontier. These authors ﬁnd it unrealistic to believe that parties are able to
commit themselves to actually execute the ‘no trade’ threat at date 2, when
they know that there are positive gains from trade.16 From a complete con-
tracts perspective, the parties can anticipate the renegotiation outcome and
make it part of the initial contract. They can hence conﬁne their attention to
contracts which are never renegotiated. Of course, the lack of commitment
power can only harm the parties, since the class of contracts is thus reduced
to contracts which satisfy additional renegotiation-proofness constraints.
Both research programs therefore suggest a closer look at the issue of
renegotiation.17 This is a diﬃcult issue. Some authors argue that the date-2-
bargaining game can be designed at date 0. In the present setting, one could
then give the seller all date-2-bargaining power. If this is possible, the original
contract can be simple indeed, since it needs just specify ‘no trade and no
payments’. Whenever there are positive gains from trade, the seller will then
make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the buyer demanding his valuation as price
for the good, and the ﬁrst best is achieved.18 Such results are interesting,
because they show that a contingent contract can be substituted by a simple
contract and a renegotiation game.19 The problem with this approach is that
16See Tirole (1999) for a discussion of this controversial issue.
17See Schmitz (2005a) for a discussion whether or not courts should enforce contractual
clauses that rule out renegotiation.
18Chung (1991) and Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1990, 1994) show that with renego-
tiation design the ﬁrst best can also be achieved if both parties must make self investments.
In this case, the original contract must specify trade with a certain probability q0 ∈ (0,1).
19However, it may be questioned whether writing an unconditional contract and de-
signing a renegotiation procedure is qualitatively diﬀerent from writing a comprehensive
contract.
9it is unclear whether a renegotiation game can be designed ex ante and, more
basically, it is unclear why the second criticism above should not be applicable
here. For example, if the renegotiation game consists of a ‘take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer’, what about the ‘or-leave-it’ part? This is certainly ineﬃcient.20 If this
were a credible threat at date 2, why should one rule out contracts that may
lead to ineﬃcient out-of-equilibrium outcomes at date 0?
Other authors argue that one should take the renegotiation game as ex-
ogenously given. There are many games the parties could play. For example,
Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995) postulate one certain non-cooperative bargain-
ing game with the property that the party which does prefer the eﬃcient
trade decision given the initial contract gets the total renegotiation surplus if
the other party were to trigger an ineﬃcient outcome under the terms of the
initial contract.21 They then consider simple option contracts which give the
seller the right to decide at date 2 whether or not to trade at a prespeciﬁed
price. Since only the seller could trigger an ineﬃcient outcome given such
an initial contract, this means in eﬀect that the buyer has all the bargaining
power at date 2. Even though the buyer gets the total renegotiation surplus,
the seller can still be given incentives to invest, since now the threatpoint in
20Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1992) argue in their Proposition 1 that hardly anything can
be implemented if ineﬃcient threats in the renegotiation game are ruled out.
21Their game is a reduced form of the more complicated bargaining process described
by Hart and Moore (1988), which takes place over several rounds (there is a last date when
trade can occur). These authors also show that the ﬁrst best can be achieved in the case
of one-sided self investment. They get an ineﬃciency result for the case of two-sided self
investment, which crucially relies on their assumption that speciﬁc performance contracts
are ruled out (courts cannot enforce contracts that specify a certain trade level). This
assumption, which has also been made by Tirole (1986), is not made in any other paper
discussed here.
10the bargaining game is no longer zero. In the case of self investment, the seller
can increase her threatpoint payoﬀ by exerting eﬀort. Nöldeke and Schmidt
(1995) show that indeed the ﬁrst best can be achieved with an appropriately
chosen strike price, even if two-sided self investments are required.22
Of course, there are many alternative ways in which renegotiation could
be modeled. One popular concept is the Nash bargaining solution. Edlin and
Reichelstein (1996) show that in this case the ﬁr s tb e s tc a nb ea c h i e v e dw i t h
an appropriate ﬁxed-price contract, provided that the seller’s eﬀort is self in-
vestment.23 For the case of cooperative investment, Maskin and Moore (1999)
and Che and Hausch (1999) prove that the ﬁrst best cannot be achieved, even
with arbitrary complex initial contracts, if ineﬃcient outcomes are renegoti-
ated according to the Nash bargaining solution.24 The intuitive reason for
their result is that if investment is cooperative, then the seller’s eﬀort can
22The buyer always gets the renegotiation surplus and hence has the right incentives
since he is residual claimant on the margin. If trade is always eﬃcient (e.g., since there is
no uncertainty), then one can set the strike price so high that the seller always wants to
trade. There will then never be scope for renegotiation and the right investment incentives
result. If trade is not always eﬃcient, the price must be lower, so that the seller does not
overinvest. See also Bös and Lülfesmann (1996) for a related analysis in the context of
public procurement.
23In the present setting of an indivisible good, such a contract would require trade with
a certain probability q0 ∈ (0,1). Let the price be zero. If q0 =0 , the seller underinvests
since she receives only half of the renegotiation surplus. If q0 =1 , the buyer always insists
on trade so that the seller incurs her costs whenever trade is eﬃcient, but also half of her
costs when trade is ineﬃcient, which leads to overinvestment.
24In contrast, if renegotiation takes place according to Hart and Moore’s (1988) proce-
dure which allocates the whole renegotiation surplus to one party, the ﬁrst best can be
achieved even if investments are cooperative, provided they are one-sided (see Nöldeke and
Schmidt, 1995) or take place sequentially (see De Fraja, 1999).
11only improve the buyer’s (instead of her own) threatpoint payoﬀ.I nt h i sc a s e
it is optimal to choose ‘no trade’ as threatpoint, i.e., write no initial contract
at all.25
Let me summarize the discussion of the case of observable valuations.
If the parties can commit not to renegotiate, the ﬁrst best can be achieved
with a complex contract specifying a message game. In some cases, the
ﬁrst best can also be achieved by a simple unconditional contract which is
renegotiated. On the other hand, given a certain renegotiation procedure, it
may also happen that the ﬁrst best is no longer achievable even by complex
contracts.
3.2 Asymmetric information
Consider now the allocation problem ˜ A1 which corresponds to A1, except that
now only the buyer knows his valuation and only the seller knows her costs. It
is well known that in general there is no bargaining game in which the parties
voluntarily participate and which leads to trade whenever the buyer’s valua-
tion exceeds the seller’s costs, provided that the parties already possess their
private information when they ﬁrst meet. This is the famous impossibility re-
sult of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).26 Loosely speaking, the seller can
25Note that a distinction between Hart and Moore (1988) or Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995)
as non-cooperative approach and Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) or Che and Hausch (1999)
as cooperative approach would be somewhat misleading. There are several non-cooperative
games which lead to the Nash bargaining solution, e.g. a perturbed Nash demand game
or an alternating oﬀers game (cf. Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990). See also the appendix
of Edlin and Reichelstein (1996).
26It is required that the buyer’s valuation and the seller’s cost are continuously distrib-
uted on intersecting intervals and that they are stochastically independent. See Matsuo
(1989) for the case of discrete distributions. Some authors question the relevance of the
12only be induced to reveal her costs when she receives the total surplus, and
the buyer can only be induced to reveal his valuation when he gets the total
surplus. However, the surplus can be generated only once, so that ex post
eﬃciency cannot be achieved (provided that there is no third party willing
to subsidize the buyer and the seller).27 It is also well-known that according
to the classical results of d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) and Arrow
(1979), ex post eﬃciency can be achieved if the parties meet before they learn
their valuations. In this case the participation constraints of the parties are
less severe, since they must hold only in expectation and not for each possible
realization of the valuations.
Now consider the allocation problem ˜ A2, which corresponds to A2 except
that now only the buyer learns his valuation and only the seller learns her
costs.28 Let the eﬀort choice be hidden action. Assume that the parties have
full commitment power. Rogerson (1992) and Hermalin and Katz (1993)
show that the ﬁrst best can still be achieved with sophisticated mechanisms
which specify message games to be played at date 2, provided that eﬀort is
self investment (possibly even two-sided).29 Intuitively, the mechanism which
Bayesian mechanism design literature in the tradition of Myerson (1981) since, as has been
shown by McAfee and Reny (1992), the importance of private information is near zero if
arbitrarily small amounts of correlation are introduced. However, note that McAfee and
Reny’s (1992) bilateral trading mechanism requires large enough payments and a third
party acting as budget balancer.
27Cf. the discussion in Bulow and Roberts (1989).
28See also Schmitz (2008a), who shows that in a hold-up problem with two-sided private
information, in the absence of an ex ante contract a party’s investments may be decreasing
in its ex post bargaining power.
29For the case of one-sided investment, see also the early paper of Konakayama, Mitsui
and Watanabe (1986).
13makes them reveal their valuations does so by making them (in expected
terms) residual claimants on the margin, and this also induces them to invest
eﬃciently. It is an interesting question for future research whether (in the
spirit of Huberman and Kahn, 1988) it is also possible to achieve the ﬁrst best
with a simple, unconditional contract which is renegotiated.30 Moreover, the
case in which the seller’s investment is cooperative and the buyer has private
information needs further investigation.31
Recently a number of papers have tried to endogenize the information
structure in models that are somewhat related to allocation problem A2.
In these models, the eﬀort decision does not inﬂuence an agent’s valuation.
Instead, the investment aims at learning a given parameter with a higher
probability or precision.32 Further research along these lines certainly seems
to be worth pursuing.
30This is not an easy question since asymmetric information makes the issue of rene-
gotiation even more diﬃcult. Schmitz (2002a) shows that there exists a renegotiation
procedure such that the ﬁrst best can be achieved in the case of two-sided self invest-
ments when the initial contract just speciﬁes trade with a certain probability q0 ∈ (0,1).
See also Farrell and Gibbons (1995) for a model in which there is precontractual private
information and renegotiation.
31Schmitz (2002b) shows that in this case the ﬁrst best may not be achievable, even if
the parties can write sophisticated contracts and have full commitment power.
32For example, see Aghion and Tirole (1997), Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998), De-
watripont and Tirole (1999), Ewerhart and Schmitz (2000), Kessler (1998), Levitt and
Snyder (1995), Lewis and Sappington (1997), and Prendergast (1993).
144 Incomplete contracts and asset ownership
4.1 The property rights approach
Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Moore (1992b) and
Hart (1995) apply the incomplete contracts approach in order to explain
costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerent allocations of ownership rights.33 To clarify
the discussion, consider again allocation problem A2. So far it was assumed
that the parties’ default payoﬀs, i.e. their payoﬀs if they did not trade, were
equal to zero. This means that investments were completely relationship-
speciﬁc. If trade between the seller and the buyer under consideration did
not occur, then the investments would be lost. Now assume that the seller’s
eﬀort may also increase her payoﬀ if trade with the buyer does not occur,
because she can alternatively use her (input) good herself in order to produce
a ﬁnal good and sell it on the competitive spot market. However, the seller
can only realize this positive payoﬀ if she owns a certain asset (say, a machine
needed in order to produce the marketable good). If instead the buyer owns
this asset, then her default payoﬀ is still zero (this means that the asset is
essential to realize the returns to her investment). Ownership of an asset
is interpreted as the right to control the use of the asset (in particular, the
o w n e rc a ne x c l u d ea n y o n ee l s ef r o mu s i n gi t ) . 34 The buyer’s default payoﬀ
33While these models were originally focused on the costs and beneﬁts of vertical in-
tegration with regard to private ﬁrms, the framework can also fruitfully be applied to
the issue of privatization, see Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) and Hoppe and Schmitz
(2008).
34One could argue that in the original formulation of A2, ownership means the right
to decide whether or not the good is exchanged without payments (in the absence of
renegotiation, the seller would choose no trade, while the buyer would choose trade, so the
allocation of ownership would be equivalent to writing one of two simple contracts in the
15does not depend on the seller’s eﬀort (it is investment in her human capital,
not in the asset) and for simplicity is assumed to be zero (i.e., the seller
is indispensable). Trade between the buyer and the seller is always ex post
eﬃcient by assumption. The class of contracts that can be written ex ante is
restricted to the allocation of ownership rights. The idea is that the good to
be traded at date 2 cannot yet be described at date 0.35 Ex post negotiations
are modelled by the Nash bargaining solution.
Asset ownership is relevant because it determines the threat point of the
date-2-bargaining game. If the buyer owns the asset, the default payoﬀso f
both parties are zero. According to the Nash bargaining solution, the seller
then gets half of the gains from trade at date 2, hence there will be un-
derinvestment. If the seller owns the asset, she could sell her good on the
spot market, while the buyer’s default payoﬀ is zero. The seller’s payoﬀ af-
sense of Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) without the need to specify the good ex ante). This
would be misleading. The fact that the buyer owns the asset means that he can deny the
seller access to the asset, but the buyer cannot force the seller to incur costs. This would
be diﬀerent with a public good or externality interpretation (the owner decides whether
or not to produce; production is beneﬁcial for one party but has negative external eﬀects
on the other party), where the decision variable is one-dimensional. If there is no prior
contract in a pure private good setting, the seller always has the right not to deliver and
the buyer always has the right not to accept any delivery.
35Aghion and Tirole (1994) relate ownership directly to the good to be traded, even
though ex ante it cannot be described. They assume that at date 2 no more costs have
to be incurred by the seller and that only the buyer can market the good. Hence, both
parties’ default payoﬀs under seller-ownership are zero, while under buyer-ownership the
buyer gets the full gains from trade. It it diﬃcult to justify why in the latter case the
seller cannot simply keep her good. One might argue that the seller produces non-tangible
ideas which cannot be hidden from the buyer, but then it is unclear why this is possible
under seller-ownership.
16ter renegotiation equals her potential spot market revenue plus half of the
amount by which the gains from trade with the buyer exceed this revenue.
Hence, she gets half of her default payoﬀ plus half of the gains from trade
with the buyer. If the marginal return to her investment were the same inde-
pendent of whether she sold to the buyer or on the spot market, then the ﬁrst
best would be achieved. However, the fact that investments are relationship-
speciﬁc usually means that they increase the seller’s default payoﬀ less than
the gains from trade with the buyer. Hence, there is underinvestment, but it
is less severe than in the case of buyer-ownership. The fundamental insight
of this analysis is that if only one party has an investment opportunity, then
this party should be the asset owner.
The model can be generalized to the case in which both parties can exert
eﬀort and may realize positive payoﬀs outside their relationship. Then the
party whose investments are ‘more important’ (in the sense of their marginal
impacts on the default payoﬀs) should be the owner. A central insight of
the literature for this case is that joint ownership in the sense of bilateral
veto-power (the asset can only be used if both parties unanimously agree)
can never be optimal.36 The intuitive reason is that if bilateral veto power is
substituted by unilateral veto power, then the investment incentives of the
new owner can only be higher (since consent of the other party to use the
asset is no longer required if no agreement is reached), while those of the
other party cannot be smaller.
It has already been pointed out that results along these lines may be crit-
36In the same spirit, two assets which are complementary (i.e., useless unless they are
c o m b i n e d )s h o u l da l w a y sb eo w n e db yt h es a m ep a r t y . I ft h e yw e r eo w n e db yd i ﬀerent
parties, this would be equivalent to bilateral veto power over the combination of both
assets. See Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995).
17icized because it is assumed that initially only simple governance structures
such as buyer-ownership, seller-ownership or joint ownership are considered.
For example, it may be beneﬁcial to consider stochastic ownership structures
or options to own.37 Moreover, it is unclear what is the precise meaning
of the assumption that on the one hand the good to be traded at date 2
can only be described ex post, but not ex ante, while on the other hand the
parties may ex ante foresee their date-2-payoﬀs. Maskin and Tirole (1999a)
have recently stressed the incompatibility of unforeseeable contingencies and
sequential rationality. They prove that ex ante undescribability is often ir-
relevant, since sophisticated mechanisms in the spirit of Moore and Repullo
(1988) can be used to implement the same payoﬀ outcomes as if contin-
gencies were describable.38 In contrast, Hart and Moore (1999) and Segal
(1999) argue that even if contingencies are perfectly describable, the impos-
sibility of ruling out renegotiation in the real world is suﬃcient to make such
mechanisms worthless.39 However, the fact that under certain circumstances
writing no contract may be optimal still does not explain the prevalence of
certain simple ownership arrangements (that are usually deterministic and
37See also Hart (1995). Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998) show that options to own may
under certain circumstances even achieve the ﬁrst best if the parties invest sequentially.
38Since observable but non-veriﬁable information that is no longer payoﬀ-relevant cannot
be elicited as a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, it is required that the optimal
complete contract would not discriminate between payoﬀ-equivalent states.
39Recall that in the simple hold-up framework it turned out that contracts are worthless
if investments are cooperative and renegotiation cannot be ruled out. In the case of selﬁsh
investments such a result can only be obtained if the number of goods that can potentially
be traded ex post tends to inﬁnity, while investments can merely enhance the gains from
trading only one speciﬁcg o o d .
18unconditional).40 Of course, this does not imply that incomplete contract
models are completely useless. One may just accept that (for reasons which
are not yet fully understood) in certain real world applications some simple
governance structures are predominant and ask which of these are optimal
under what circumstances. If the insights of the property rights approach
were particularly robust, then they would be very valuable with regard to
such important questions.
4.2 Robustness of the property rights approach
Recent papers show that the basic insights of the incomplete contracts ap-
proach are quite sensitive to the underlying assumptions. DeMeza and Lock-
wood (1998) and Chiu (1998) point out that the results critically depend
on the exact nature of the renegotiation game. They assume the so-called
deal-me-out solution, according to which each party receives half of the gains
from trade, except in cases in that one party would thus receive less than
its outside option payoﬀ. In such cases the party that would be worse oﬀ
receives its outside option payoﬀ, and the other party is residual claimant.
An alternating oﬀers bargaining game leads to the deal-me-out solution if a
party has the possibility to choose the outside option and thus stop bargain-
ing, while Grossman and Hart’s (1986) split-the-diﬀerence rule is appropriate
if the parties receive their threatpoint payoﬀs while they are bargaining (so-
called inside options) or if bargaining can break down with an exogenously
given probability. If the deal-me-out solution is assumed, a party’s invest-
ment incentives can be strengthened when it loses control over an asset. The
reason is as follows. Assume that the parties’ outside option payoﬀs are ini-
40See also Tirole (1999) and Maskin and Tirole (1999b).
19tially smaller than half of the gains from trade. Then the gains from trade
are split equally, so that party 1 does not receive the full marginal returns
on its investment. If asset ownership is transferred from party 1 to party
2, the outside option payoﬀ of party 2 may become larger than half of the
gains from trade, so that party 1 becomes residual claimant and therefore
has improved investment incentives.41
Even if one does not change the assumptions about renegotiation, the
basic results of the property rights literature may not be robust under cer-
tain circumstances. Rajan and Zingales (1998) point out that if a party’s
investment has a negative eﬀect on this party’s default payoﬀ,t h e no w n e r -
ship can reduce investment incentives, so that it may be optimal to allocate
asset ownership to a non-investing party.42 Rosenkranz and Schmitz (1999,
2003) argue that in the context of research joint ventures joint ownership
in the sense of bilateral veto power can be optimal. The reason is that the
parties are not only concerned about incentives to exert eﬀort, but also about
incentives to disclose know-how. Know-how disclosure can be modelled as
41T h ef a c tt h a td i ﬀerent assumptions about renegotiation may lead to substantially
diﬀerent results is by now well known. In the standard hidden action principal-agent
model, Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) show that high eﬀort cannot be implemented with
probability one if the principal makes the renegotiation oﬀer, while Ma (1994) shows that
the second best of the model without renegotiation can be obtained if the agent proposes
the renegotiation contract.
42See also Schmitz and Sliwka (2001) for a related result. There it is assumed that
the parties can choose the degree of asset speciﬁcity. If only one party invests it can be
optimal to make the other party owner of the asset, since this induces a higher degree of
speciﬁcity (provided that speciﬁcity is not contractible). If the parties have the possibility
to contractually determine speciﬁc i t y ,i ti sa l w a y so p t i m a lt om a k et h ei n v e s t i n gp a r t y
owner. However, then the parties will deliberately choose less then the ﬁr s tb e s td e g r e eo f
speciﬁcity, since this improves investment incentives.
20a form of cooperative investment, i.e., it improves the other party’s default
payoﬀ. Therefore, it may well happen that a party will not disclose its know-
how unless it has veto power (since then the other party’s default payoﬀ is
always zero) and thus bilateral veto power can indeed be optimal. Further
research with regard to the robustness of the results reported in Hart and
Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) certainly seems to be desirable.43
5C o n c l u s i o n
The discussion can be summarized as follows. Even though it is diﬃcult
to justify the ad hoc restriction on the class of contracts, the incomplete
contracts approach can help to explain which arrangements are optimal in
a given set of governance structures. While the results seem to crucially
depend on the exact nature of the assumptions made, this approach can
yield a number of interesting insights which go beyond the results that have
been obtained in the traditional complete contracts theory.
However, does this really mean that the idea of Grossman and Hart (1986)
to look for the optimal governance structure in a given set of rules is a path-
breaking novelty? One might have some doubts that this really is the case.
In fact, the comparison of the implications of rational behavior under some
exogenously given rules is an old habit of the law and economics literature
(which, of course, is also strongly inﬂuenced by the work of Ronald Coase).
The typical approach of this literature can for example be illustrated by
43In more recent research, Schmitz (2006, 2008b) has shown that some of the most
prominent implications of the property rights approach may be overturned if a party has
private information about its default payoﬀ. In particular, ownership by a non-investing
party and joint ownership may be optimal.
21Shavell (1984).44 In this paper, strict liability and safety regulation in the
sense of a uniform minimum standard are compared. More general rules of
regulation (which could in particular mimick everything that liability can
achieve) are simply not considered. Obviously, the arguably old-fashioned
way in which only two special rules are compared in such papers is not
qualitatively diﬀe r e n tf r o mw h a ti sd o n ei nt h er e c e n ti n c o m p l e t ec o n t r a c t s
literature. Hence, the fact that putting ad hoc restrictions on the class of
analyzed rules has a long tradition in the law and economics literature may
indeed cast some doubts on the novelty of the allegedly path-breaking incom-
plete contracts approach. What may be diﬀerent is the fact that following
Grossman and Hart (1986) at least some authors try to argue more care-
fully why they think the restriction they make is reasonable. Moreover, the
contribution of Grossman and Hart (1986) is also novel since they no longer
identify ownership with income streams, but draw the attention to control
rights instead.
In any case, one may argue that bounded rationality may ultimately
explain why agents consider only some rules or contracts. However, it is then
not clear whether it makes sense to build models in which the parties perfectly
foresee the outcome of rational behavior given such rules or contracts. This
certainly seems to be a diﬃcult but important topic for future research.45
44See Brown (1973) and Calabresi (1970) for early research comparing liability rules.
See also Schmitz (2000) for a detailed discussion of Shavell (1984).
45See also Tirole (1999) and Schmitz (2005b) for discussions of the fact that some
questions that have been addressed in the incomplete contracting framework may also
be analyzed in traditional complete contracting models.
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